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THE ABSENCE OF BODY IN CYBERSPACE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IMPACT
by
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The  "computer  ontology"  has  an  impact  on  constructing  the  offenders’  and  
victims’ identities and it also shapes the image of a judge. The present paper focuses  
on body as one of the central ideas in criminal law. In cyberspace, the body extends  
outward into data: digitized identity cards, sentencing information systems, risk  
assessment instruments, etc. Some authors talk about the disappearance of body-in-
law (Redhead), others about the expansion of data/body (Brown). The impact of the  
so-called "computer ontology" can be observed in police investigation, prosecution,  
judging and sentencing. In criminal investigation, "evidence" is rendered into a  
data-human  form.  The  nature  of  victimization,  as  seen  from  the  victim’s  
perspective, is challenged: which type of victimization should be perceived as the  
"real"  one?  On the  other  hand,  the  notion  of  a  criminal  offender  is  conceived  
through  the  optic  of  pre-defined  "risk  factors"  and  other  pre-defined  attributes  
recognized by the criminal legal system. In systems with sentencing information  
instruments, a judge has to take into consideration only the factors that have been  
previously anticipated, estimated as relevant and adequately pondered. Franko Aas  
believes that "a delinquent with a soul" has already ceased to exist and instead  
suggests denoting a subject as a "data-vidual". A subject – an offender is thus no  
longer  perceived  as  a  contextualized  multi-dimensional  entity,  but  as  a  de-
contextualized two-dimensional abstract object. From cybercrime perspective, the  
paper tackles one of the central presumptions of criminal law and criminology, i.e.  
the presumption of a generic offender.
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Introduction [1]
The  information-communication  technology  (ICT)  “ontology”  or 
computer “logic” has an impact on constructing the offenders’ and victims’ 
identities  and,  in  addition,  it  also  shapes  the  image  of  a  judge.  In 
cyberspace,  the  body  extends  outward  into  data  through  the  use  of 
digitized  identity  cards,  sentencing  information  instruments,  risk 
assessment instruments, etc. Some authors talk about the disappearance of 
body-in-law  (Redhead  1995),  while  others  identify  the  expansion  of 
data/body and claim that  a  “body-in-law” is  no longer  a stable point  of 
reference  (Brown 2006).  Computer  “logic”  is  thus  changing  our  existing 
notion  of  a  subject  as  a  unique,  biologically,  sociologically  and 
psychologically determined human being. 
In contemporary crime policy and criminal justice system, the offender is 
no longer perceived as a contextualized multi-dimensional  human being. 
One is no longer regarded as a totality of “body and soul”. As is the case in 
cyberspace, the body ceases to be important. The subject is taken to pieces 
and  perceived  as  a  componential,  decontextualized  two-dimensional 
abstract object which is later on reconstructed according to the parameters 
of a particular agency of criminal justice system.
To support the above mentioned thesis, the paper presents the following 
arguments:
1. the relativity of the concept of “crime” and “offender”,
2. the  wider  cultural  implications  of  the  “ICT  ontology” that  reconfigure  the 
relative concept of offender,  and the  ICT “ontology”   impact on criminal justice  
system in: police investigation,  prosecution, judging and sentencing procedure.
The Nature of the Concept of “Crime” and “Offender” [2]
Discussing  the  different  or  changing  “notions  of  an  offender” 
presupposes  that  the  notions  of  crime  and  offender  are  relative.  The 
argument that is pursued should therefore not be understood in legalistic 
terms by which a crime is defined as a violation of criminal substantial law 
and an offender is defined as a person found guilty in a criminal procedure 
according to the beforehand set of criminal substantial rules.
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What is crime? [2.1]
In the 20th century, the critical discourses (abolitionism, labelling theory, 
symbolical interventionism, feminist perspectives and Foucauldian analyses 
of  penalty)  showed that  crime is  a  relative  concept.  Crime is  defined as 
something that a particular society in a particular historical moment defines 
as an offence. It  is not an objective phenomenon ontologically present in 
nature or something that is waiting to be revealed. It is a social construction, 
a label for particular acts.
“What in fact is a criminal?” [2.2]
According to Garland (1985: 122), this question forms the basis of criminology. 
The quest for “criminality”, an element that would distinguish the criminal from 
the non-criminal, was the central question of early “criminology”. But, have we 
managed to find the firm, solid ground where “criminality” is rooted?
The following three arguments disclose the notion of a criminal, and show 
its contingent nature and relativity:
1. the Nietzschean argument, whereby the ideas inherent in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy were  precursor to the so called “post-modern” theory, 
2. the argument deriving from Foucault’s concept of criminology and  
3. the argument deriving from the changed social control in “risk society” 
(Beck).
The Nietzschean Concept of an Offender [2.2.1]
When denoting someone as a criminal  (i.e. the subject as a responsible 
agent), we are, according to Nietzsche, committing four false inferences:
“At first we call particular acts good or evil without any consideration of their  
motives, but simply on the basis of their beneficial or harmful consequences. Soon,  
however, we forget the origin of these terms and imagine that the quality ‘good’ or  
‘evil’  is  inherent  in  the  actions  themselves,  without  consideration  of  the  
consequences; […] – that is, we take the effect to be the cause. Then we assign the  
goodness  or  evil  to  the  motives,  and  regard  the  acts  themselves  as  morally  
ambiguous.  We  even  go  further  and  cease  to  give  the  particular  motive  the  
predicate good or evil, but give it rather to the whole nature of the man.”1
1 Nietzsche (2002: Aphorism 39).
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To put it more clearly, we lay blame on the man:
1. for the effects of his actions,
2. for his actions,
3. for his motives, and
4. finally, for his nature.
Foucault’s Concept of Criminology [2.2.2]
Similarly, Foucault’s account of criminology discloses the same relativistic 
understanding of the criminal offender.2 The science of criminology, in his 
opinion, emerged and persisted because it had institutional coverage in the 
form of prison which  enabled “individualisation”. By individualisation he 
means the way in which the main architectural features of prison with its 
primary  units  in  the  form  of  separate  cells  containing  the  individual 
prisoner  and  the  prison  organisation  itself  “affected  the  way  in  which 
offender was viewed” (Garland 1985: 115). The criminological inquiry was 
made possible, because its object  was already “there”,  it was eligible for 
observation and available for analysis. The prison organization itself in this 
way influences our perception of how we see the criminal. The individual is 
thus not simply “here”.
Changed Social Control in “Risk Society” (Beck) [2.2.3]
In  today’s  post-modern  society,  social  control  is  no  longer  performed 
through  interpersonal  interaction,  but  has  rather  been  entrusted  to  an 
automated basis.  One just  has to  think of the wide-spread emergence of 
“Automated  Socio-Technical  Environments”  (Lianos  and  Douglas  2000), 
like online banking systems, automated car parks, the collection a reserved 
plane  or  train  ticket  delivered  by  a  lounge  machine,  the  withdrawal  of 
money from a cash dispenser (ATM),  etc.  In all  of  the above mentioned 
cases,  the  user  can  not  negotiate  with  the  system.  There  is  no  need  for 
polished social skills, no need to demonstrate ethical probity.
Who is, therefore, regarded as an offender in these types of environment? 
Lianos and Douglas (2000: 265) claim that in such environments “the law-
abiding  citizen”  is  replaced  with  the  “efficient  user”.  And who  are  the 
2 Foucault (1975, 1988), Ostrander (1988).
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deviants? They are  not  the moral  incorrigibles,  nor  are  they the morally 
condemned.  They  are  simply  “dangerous”  and  “risky”.  Their  actually 
committing an offence is a matter of secondary importance to the parts of 
society that define what deviance is. What is important is their perceived 
probability of being dangerous, their riskiness. 
Departing from the fact that the notions of crime and offender are relative, 
we can now identify the building bricks which ICT is providing for those 
concepts, i. e. the way ICT is re-configuring the concept of an offender.
The Cultural Implications of ICT “Ontology” and its
Impact on the Criminal Justice System [3]
The main impact of ICT on the criminal justice system is in the new ways 
of producing knowledge. ICT offers new parameters for describing the social 
landscape,  including  the  crime  control  mechanisms  and  criminal  justice 
system. It is fundamentally changing the way we perceive ourselves through 
the  changes  in  the  parameters  that  make  us  unique  human  beings.  For 
instance, we are able to enter a particular virtual area only if we posses our 
“digital double” – ID card or password; the identification in online services 
(e.g.  electronic  banking  system)  is  performed  with  the  use  of  a  digital 
certificate; our bodies are digitalized and changed into information patterns 
in biometrical technologies, etc. The research into the cultural impacts of ICT 
confirms  that  databases  have  indeed  become  the  privileged  way  of 
constructing  knowledge.3 “We have succeeded too well in shutting out the 
narrative – from theories, our research and our courts.”4 On the other hand, 
some scholars see the narrative  as crucial to the development  of law. “It is 
really a matter of whose story carries the day” (Miller 2001: 156). And whose 
story carries the day nowadays? Not surprisingly, the narrative is, after all, 
not expelled from the courts entirely: it continues to survive in courts among 
upper  and  upper-middle  class  defendants  and  other  institutionally 
“sympathetic”  defendants  (e.  g.  police).  The new forms  of  knowledge  are 
thus exercised only over the population that has no social power. 
This  transformation  of  knowledge  from  a  narrative  into  a  database 
3 Manovich (2001), Poster (1990, 1996), Franko Aas (2004). 
4 Miller (2001: 156).
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principally  means  that  a  database  as  a  collection  of  the  most  diverse 
information  about  an  individual  has  become  the  privileged  way  of 
constructing knowledge about the criminal as well. The agencies of criminal 
justice (the police, courts, prisons, etc.) are no longer interested in people as 
unique, biologically, sociologically and psychologically determined human 
beings, as the totality of “body and soul” in the existent narrative form, but 
are now focused only on the pre-determined computer-based parameters 
relevant to their decision. Thus, the »delinquent with a soul« ceased to exist 
(Franko Aas 2005: 107).  What is left  in the contemporary criminal justice 
system’s  discourse  is  better  denoted  by  the  notion  of  a  »data-vidual«, 
dividuum  (Deleuze  1995),  »categorical  individuum«  (Calhoun  1995)  or 
“fading subject”. One is no longer relevant as a person, as one’s life story 
ceases to be important.
The  “information  revolution”  has  thus  transformed  all  social  systems, 
including the criminal justice system. Where can these changes be seen?
Agencies of Criminal Justice System [3.2]
Our comprehension of the performance of the agencies of criminal justice 
system is defined by the means we use to observe and analyse them. A 
computer-mediated analysis contains  the parameters  complying with the 
computer “logic”. The parameters that do not fit into this “logic” are left out 
and are gradually disregarded. 
Crime Prevention Strategies [3.2]
In crime prevention strategies, the criminal is conceived through the optic 
of the pre-defined “risk factors” and other pre-defined attributes. The tools 
used by the various agents of the criminal legal system in crime prevention 
are a part of risk management ideology and form the so-called government-
at-a-distance.  According  to  Gottfredson  and  Tonry,  the  risk  assessment 
instruments in particular present one of the most important reforms of the 
judicial system in the last 20 years. The purpose of these changes was to 
assure  transparency,  consistence,  rationality,  uniformity,  and 
standardization of the system.
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Crime Investigation [3.3]
In  crime  investigation,  the  “evidence”  is  converted  into  a  data-human 
form  (for  instance,  DNA  profiles  and  digitization  of  other  traces).  The 
narratives, i.e. the “life-records” of the individuals are no longer important. 
The only important factors nowadays are the new right-wing slogans, such 
as “zero tolerance” and “three strikes and you are out”.
Judging [3.4]
The nature of judging has also transformed accordingly. The image of a 
judge  as  a  person  of  authority  looking  into  the  eye  of  the  defendants, 
listening to their explanation and reasons, and examining their history, is 
almost a caricature portraying the past. Instead, the judge is becoming just 
another state official, engaged in reducing the problems of case overload (a 
problem all European governments are facing according to the European 
Court of Human Rights judgements concerning the right to a speedy trial.) 
The criminal procedure is thus gradually becoming less dependent on the 
concrete decider and is transformed into binary computer language. 
Sentencing Information Instruments [3.5]
In legal systems with sentencing information instruments, the ICT impact 
is even more devastating: there, in a sentencing procedure a judge has to 
take into consideration only the factors that are anticipated and estimated as 
relevant by the computer software. The sentencing procedure thus depends 
less and less on the concrete decider; as a consequence, the judges are under 
pressure  to  externalize  all  their  thoughts  about  the  case,  which  is 
impossible. The externalization of judicial thinking eventually leads into a 
standardization of  knowledge,  thinking and ideas.  The user negotiations 
with the system are excluded in the so-called “Automated Socio-Technical 
Environments” (Lianos and Douglas 2000). The “individual” punishment is 
thus giving way to “tariff” punishment, and, as these tariffs are passed by 
distant  political  actors  (i.e.  sentencing  commissions),  the  theorists  are 
denoting the process as »sentencing-at-a-distance«.5
5 Franko Aas (2005).
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Instead of Conclusion  [3.6]
Our understanding of  the world is  assuming the computer “logic”.  As 
mentioned  above,  ICT  is  constantly  generating  new  notions  about  the 
world.  The  adoption  of  ICT in  life  sciences  is  one  of  the  most  concrete 
examples of the transformations pertaining to the notion of a human being. 
The descriptions of brain activity, the neurological structure or the human 
genome strongly resemble the ICT “ontology”: in all cases the information 
is transferred, stored, recalled, reactivated, etc. This fusion of ICT and life 
sciences, metaphorically termed as the “fusion of a computer and a gene”, 
is,  according to many authors,6 the new technological  revolution leading 
from the industrial to the bio-technological age (as represented by the bio-
informatics and molecular computers).
What does this have to do with the criminal justice system? The crime 
policy of the “risk society” (Beck) is facing the emergence of the concept of 
the individual  “genetically at  risk”,7 also of offending.  The notion of the 
individual »genetically at risk« of offending strongly resembles the notions 
of “pre-delinquent”, “near-criminal” and “presumptive criminal” that were 
already thought to be a matter of the past. 
ICT logic neglects all knowledge statements unable to be digitalized and 
is therefore in this way reducing knowledge. In our technological world, the 
subject is taken to pieces, dismantled into an entity of arbitrary collected 
attributes,  componential,  standardized,  decontextualized  and constructed 
according to parameters of certain technology. In this type of circumstances, 
the new knowledge can be dangerous  – it  represents  new power and is 
transforming crime control.
Conclusion [4]
Computer  “ontology”  has  penetrated  penal  culture.  It  has  an  impact  on 
constructing the offenders’ and victims’ identities, and it presupposes a certain 
image of the judge. One can observe the impact of the ICT “ontology” in all 
agencies of the criminal  justice system and all phases of criminal  procedure: 
police investigation, prosecution, judging and sentencing procedure. 
6 Rifkin (1998).
7 Novas and Rose (2000: 502)
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In analysing ICT impact on crime and control, the theory has mostly been 
concerned with identifying the changes emerging on three different levels:
1. crime scene (i.e. virtual space)
2. forms  of  crimes:  old  crimes  in  new  forms  (e.g.  cyber  stalking)  and 
completely  new crimes (e.g. hacking)
3. criminal system intervention (i.e. e-jurisdiction, e-punishment).
The technological progress is, in addition to the above mentioned areas, 
also  changing  the  notion  of  subjectivity. In  a  technologically  mediated 
world, a different notion of a subject is emerging, tackling two central ideas 
of criminal law: body and narrative. This is therefore the 4th level of changes 
in  crime  that  have  been  provoked  by  the  ICT.  The  contrast  between 
cyberspace and biometry, the disappearing of body in the former and the 
idea that the body can be used as a passport in the latter shows that the 
body as such is no longer a stable point of reference. As Brown (2006: 234) 
asks: “Is the body human? Is human necessarily embodied?” At this point 
we can conclude by saying that, in this technosocial world, the notion of a 
human being is very fragile and more and more unclear. 
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